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Jordan is a recent entrant to the domestic defense industry with the establishment 
of King Abdullah II Design and Development Bureau (KADDB) in 1999.  As a measure 
of the importance Jordan attaches to the creation of this fledgling industry, KADDB was 
established by royal decree, and reports directly to the King of Jordan.1  KADDB is to 
provide scientific and technical services to the Jordan Armed Forces, to supply defense 
and commercial equipment customized to meet the needs of clients in the Middle East 
and North Africa, and to assist Jordan in creating a sustainable industrial base that would 
complement commercial civilian applications.2   Jordan markets  itself as the “Gateway to 
the Middle East” and within that context, KADDB has positioned itself as the 
“Technology Partner of Choice for the Middle East and North Africa.” 
In contrast to other countries that have developed domestic defense industries for 
strategic reasons, Jordan’s primary reasons appear to be economic .3  As part of an 
economic reform program, the defense industrial initiative intends to jumpstart 
                                                
1 KADDB publication. 
2 To facilitate the establishment of a civilian commercial industry, KADDB and the Royal Scientific 
Society (RSS) signed an agreement early 2005 to establish a commercial industrial research center, the 
Center for Applied Industrial Research (CAIR).  CAIR technical staff will consist of scientists from both 
organizations.  CAIR’s stated goal will be to advance Jordan’s science based industries by focusing on 
fields of research such as materials science, energy, water resources, biomechanics, nanotechnology, and 
safety and security.  The UK’s Defense Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA) identified these fields of 
research as areas that are attracting resources for research and development in NATO (Jane’s International 
Defense Review, 2002) 
3 The motivations for domestic defense production are to reduce dependence on outside arms suppliers, to 
enhance a nations status in the international community, to facilitate the transfer of technology, and, over 
time, to gain economically.   South Africa’s stated goal in developing its defense industry in the early 
1960s was (Brauer 2002) to provide the country with a reliable source of arms after its increasing isolation 
from the world as a result of its apartheid policies.  After the emergence of a new political order in 1994, 
following the election of an ANC led government, and the lifting of the UN arms embargo, the defense 
industry underwent substantial restructuring with the new government struggling to justify maintaining the 
existence of the industry.  Eventually, the justification focused on trade, economics, and employment 
maintenance and creation. (Batchelor and Willett 1998). 
Brazil built an defense industry for national security to enhance its ambitions both as a regional and global 
power (Freeman 2002) and as a preemptive strategic move (Brauer 2002). 
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industrialization across a range of sectors.  Jordan’s goals are to stimulate the 
development of a defense scientific industrial base, to enable import substitution and 
export sales generation, to ensure the development of domestic industries and technology, 
to provide training to technical personnel for improved employment opportunities, and to 
promote the development of regional industrial joint ventures.4  With the Jordanian 
defense expenditures at 8.7% of GDP,  the Jordanian authorities created the defense 
industry to utilize defense budget spending power to assist in economic growth without 
placing additional demands on the national budget. 5   Table 1 details Jordan’s defense 
burden and military expenditures from 1992-2002.  The Jordanian defense industrial 
initiative is being undertaken during a period of uncertainty as to the future security 
environment.6     
In this study, I review the Jordanian defense industry and assess the success and 
failure of this industry as a stimulus to economic development.  In addition, I evaluate the 
resulting employment creation, technology transfer, improved trade, and both backward 
and forward linkages to the civilian industrial sectors.  I compare the economic 
achievements of the defense industry to those of the  Qualified Economic Zones (QIZ), 
another major government facilitated economic development mechanism. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  Section two reviews the economics 
of military industries.  Section three provides an introduction to Jordan and the evolution 
of its economy.  Section four details KADDB and describe its role in the Jordanian 
                                                
4 KADDB, Jane’s IDR 2002. 
5  Looney (1988) points out that the economic effects of military industrialization can not be considered 
separate from patterns of military spending.  He concludes that developing countries may minimize the 
adverse impacts of increasing military burdens by creating macro-linkages from the arms industry to the 
economy. 
6 SIPRI Military Expenditures and Arms Production Project – June 2005. 
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economy. Section five reviews KADDB’s accomplishments, compares it that of the QIZs 
and the last section offers concluding remarks. 
 
II. Economics of Military Industries 
  The creation of indigenous defense industries in developing countries is 
motivated by a variety of strategic, political, and economic factors.  Since arms are not 
regarded as a purely commercial good, their production in developing countries is not 
governed solely by the economics of comparative advantage.  A strategic motivation 
behind the creation of a military industry is to reduce the dependence on unreliable, or 
potentially unreliable, sources of arms.  South Africa, for example,  initiated an intense 
effort to build its military industry in the late 1960s and early 1970s in anticipation of an 
arms embargo.7  Brazil, from the late 1960s, pursued a political strategy of building up its 
defense industry not only as part of its ambitions to be a regional power and a symbol of 
national pride, but also in response to a US arms embargo.8  Yet, once political conditions 
change, nations reassess  the benefit of defense industries to national strategic goals. 
Proponents of a domestic defense industry argue that industrial development, job 
creation, and export opportunities provide marginal benefits in excess of marginal costs.  
Ideally, the defense industry would promote the development of human capital and 
prevent the emigration of skilled labor. The creation of a military industry would also 
promote the development of a civilian industry by providing backward linkages into the 
economy for support industries and forward linkages by feeding into downstream 
industries.  Offset deals, co-production and license agreements with foreign producers 
                                                
7 Krause (1992), Anthony (1993), and Brauer (2002).  
8 Freeman (2002) and Brauer (2002) 
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would promote technology transfer from more technologically advanced nations.  Ideally, 
the country would improve its balance of payments by import substitution 
industrialization, substituting the imports of arms for those locally produced, and by 
exporting to foreign markets, thus saving foreign currency. 
However,  there are many hidden costs in defense production.  Developing 
countries rely on importing raw material, parts, and technology for the industry.  These 
imports drain the foreign exchange reserves that the defense industry generates.  Arms 
exports and industries are often subsidized by governments.  The subsidies conceal the 
true cost of the transactions.  In general, defense industries are less productive than 
civilian industries and the cost of maintaining advanced technology could be prohibitive.9  
In addition, the industries demand for highly skilled  labor  could deprive civilian 
industries of resources needed to develop.10 
Krause (1992) enumerates a process,  an eleven step “ladder of production,” by 
which a developing country would progress from an arms importer to a fully independent 
arms producer (Table 2).  Krause explains such models as being descriptive of the 
evolution, rather than the linear progression,  of the defense production process.  Brauer 
(2002) points out that some countries may chose to enter into the defense production 
industry at entry points beyond stage one.  In addition, some countries may chose to 
focus on different entry points for different arms.  He distinguishes between complete 
weapons systems production and weapons modules development.  Although the US, and 
to a lesser extent, countries such as France, the UK, and Russia are technological 
                                                
9 Brzoska (1995) illustrates this point using India as an example.  After repeatedly purchasing technology 
on the international market, India failed to advance the technology on its own and fell behind the 
subsequent advances in the technological frontier made in the US and Western Europe. 
10 Batchelor and Willett (1998) make the case for South Africa. 
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innovators in defense production, Krause (1992) argues that most arms production efforts 
seem to end between stage eight and nine with progress beyond limited R&D being rare.  
While the ladder of production is descriptive of the evolution of the defense production 
process, it does not capture the time progression of the development of indigenous arms 
industries.  Figure 1 depicts the time progression of the eleven steps of the ladder of 
production as a function of the time required to attain each level.  The process is non-
linear with increasing opportunity cost for a country to reach the higher stages.  The 
production process through the first five steps can skip levels or enter at any level.  
However, it would be difficult for a country to ascend to higher stages by skipping lower 
stages.  Comparative advantage would suggest that countries should produce at a level 
with the ratio of their marginal cost to marginal benefit equal to that of other arms 
producers.   
Offsets, an industrial compensation practice imposed by the buyer country as a 
condition of purchase on the seller company, have become a popular method for 
stimulating domestic economic activity.    While civil offset programs are not permissible 
for developed countries under Article XXIII of the Government Procurement Act of the 
World Trade Organization, offsets from defense procurement are an option available to 
all countries.  The offsets can be directly linked to defense contracts such as technology 
transfer, co-production,  or local assembly related directly to the equipment purchased or 
they can be indirectly sourced where civilian, military goods, or services are unrelated to 
the defense equipment purchased.  Although, the costs and benefits of offsets are 
debatable, no compelling evidence points to the positive impact of offsets on a domestic 
economy.  This pattern is consistent across countries as varied as Brazil, India, and Saudi 
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Arabia where offsets were used to stimulate a variety of economic and industrial policy 
initiatives.11 
South Africa presents a good example of progress in indigenous defense 
production.  Batchelor and Willett (1998) divide South Africa’s defense production into 
three distinct time periods in which civilian manufacturing employment growth exceeded 
that of the defense industry and where military expenditures grew faster than total 
government expenditure.   During the first period, 1961-68, South Africa shifted away 
from a heavy reliance on complete weapons systems imports to stage five of the 
production ladder, final weapons systems assembly and local component production.  By 
the end of the second period, 1968-77, South Africa reached stage seven, limited R&D 
improvements to local license-produced arms, and was close to stage eight, limited 
independent production of less sophisticated weapons and limited production of more 
advanced weapons, in certain sections, such as ammunitions and small arms.  In the last 
period, 1977-89, the defense industry reached stage nine, independent R&D and 
production of less sophisticated weapons.  The ammunitions and small arms sector were 
at stage ten, independent R&D and production of advanced arms with foreign 
components,  Military aircraft, missiles, and naval vessels production were at much lower 
stages of the ladder. 
Defense production is less efficient  than civilian industry as its primary aim is 
raising weapons systems performance by technological improvements, rather than cost 
reduction through a streamlined production process. In addition, investment in defense 
                                                
11 Refer to Perlo-Freeman (2004) for a discussion on the Brazil offset program.  Matthews (2002) for a 
discussion regarding Saudi Arabia.  Batchelor and Willett (1998) for information on South Africa’s offsets. 
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production and poor choices of military technology led to underinvestment in civilian 
industries for the same countries.12   
The evidence in support of the economic gains from establishing military 
industries is quite mixed for developing countries.  Devarajan, Swaroop, and Zou (1996) 
test whether the share allocated to various components of government expenditures is 
associated with higher growth.  They find that defense expenditures appear to have a 
negative influence on economic growth whereas consumption oriented public 
expenditures appear to positively influence economic growth.   Dunne (1996) 
substantiates their findings and affirms that reallocations from defense spending to other 
forms of government spending have been shown to increase employment in developing 
countries.    
Batchelor and Willett (1998) analyze the economic significance of South Africa’s 
defense industry and conclude that despite increasing numbers of highly skilled workers 
employed in the industry, it absorbed scarce labor resources making them unavailable to 
the civilian industry.  Brazil’s economic gains from its weapons industry are mixed 
Although, in absolute numbers, about 200,000 jobs were created at the height of the 
industry’s success, a trivial amount for a country of Brazil’s size.13  They also point out 
that domestic defense production remained a net user of foreign exchange with no 
positive impact on the country’s technological performance.  Foreign exchange earnings 
are questionable when balanced against the cost of acquiring technology and components. 
The resulting development and success of the Brazilian civilian aircraft industry came at 
                                                
12 Batchelor and Willett (1998) report the capital intensity of the arms industry in South Africa being 
double the average of the manufacturing sector as a whole.  Hartley and Sandler (1995) highlight the fact 
that investment in indigenous arms production may have negative resource allocation effects by crowding 
out civilian investments. 
13 Brigagao (1986). 
 11 
a great cost and may have been achieved by direct government support rather than 
indirect military production promotion. In Brazil, however, the skill and technology 
levels of military and civilian industries are more compatible than in other countries and 
these industries have managed to support each other.14   
 
III. Economy of Jordan: Background 
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is a middle income country with a population 
of 5.5 million.  Jordan is a small open economy with few natural resources and little 
manufacturing, but has a large skilled population that works abroad.   Jordan has 
inadequate supplies of water and consists mainly of arid desert with around 4% arable 
land. Its main natural resources are potash and phosphate 
The main challenges facing Jordan are reducing dependence on foreign grants, 
reducing the budget deficit, and creating investment incentives to promote job creation. 
 A substantial percentage of the population, 38% is under the age of fourteen 
resulting in a rapid increase in the working age population.   Jordan currently has a large 
disparity between its official and unofficial employment rates  at 15% and 30% 
respectively.15 The GNI per capita in 2004 was $2140, which afforded the population one 
of the highest regional per capita disposable income compared to other emerging 
                                                
14Brzoska (1995) reports that the recent conflicts in the Middle East, Gulf War I, Gulf War II, have dealt a 
serious blow to the defense industries of developing nations.  The superiority of advanced technology 
weapons increased the demand for US and European weapons and closed the market for developing 
countries.  In an interview with  Gen. Div. Werlon Roure, Director of the Directoria de Material 
Belico/Brazilian Army Staff, 01/17/94, reported by Bittencourt (1994), the General summarizes the causes 
of the Brazilian defense industry crises and  points out that the “Gulf War gave absolute dominance of the 
Middle East market to the United States and some European producers.” 
India’s case differs from Brazil in that it is a situation of over ambitious expectations.  The country had 
faltered in keeping up with the current arms technology despite repeated purchasing of advanced 
technology.  Defense News, January 9, 2006 reports on the poor quality of domestically produced defense 
equipment.   In addition, Argentina’s defense productions program, started in the 1950s, faltered despite the 
existence of a relatively advanced civilian industrial base because of over ambitions expectations.  
15 CIA, The World Fact Book, 2005. 
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countries. The relatively comfortable economic situation can be credited to the country’s 
ability to maintain social and political stability.   Jordan depends on one of the world’s 
highest share of workers’ remittances, about 20% of GDP, to support its balance of 
payments. 
In the early 1990s, the Jordanian economy was highly regulated and recovering 
from an exchange rate and banking crisis.  The country was struggling to absorb 
Jordanian refugees as a result of the Gulf War.  While economic growth was due to 
housing investment, external trade and exports were predominantly mining and 
agricultural products.  The government controlled a significant share of industrial 
production and regulated commodity prices.   
Since the early 1990s, Jordan has undertaken some broad economic reforms 
aimed at stabilization by reducing the budget deficit and the foreign debt through 
forgiveness and rescheduling.  In addition, the Jordanians reduced trade tariffs and 
regulations, freed most commodity prices, and pursued a market orientation primarily 
through privatization.16  The government also has liberalized the trade regime sufficiently 
to secure Jordan's membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2000. 
Building on the related reforms enacted in 2000, Jordan and the US  began 
implementation of the Free Trade Agreement in December 2001, positioning Jordan as 
the fourth country (after Canada, Mexico, and Israel) to enjoy such a relationship with the 
US;  Jordan also has an Association Agreement with the EU (2001). These measures 
have helped improve productivity and have put Jordan on the foreign investment map.  
                                                
16 $900 million in state-owned enterprise assets have been transferred to private-sector control as of 2004, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jordan. 
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Jordan imported most of its oil from Iraq at a concessionary price, but the US-led 
war in Iraq in 2003 made Jordan more dependent on oil from other Gulf nations, forcing 
the Jordanian government to both raise the retail petroleum product prices and sales tax 
base.  The increase in petroleum product prices resulted in a spike in consumer price 
inflation and a marked increase in the current account deficit. Jordan's export market, 
which is heavily dependent on exports to Iraq, was also affected by the war.  The market 
recovered quickly, however,  due to the Iraq rebuilding effort.  
Historically, Jordan has had difficulty attracting investments.  The development of 
the US Jordan Free Trade Area Agreement (FTA),  QIZ,17 the Aqaba Special Economic 
Zone (ASEZA),18 and KADDB19 are government attempts to more closely integrate 
                                                
17 Substantial differences exist between the FTA and QIZ.  US officials established the legal framework for 
QIZs in 1996 by offering special duty and quota free access to goods produced with specified minimum 
Jordanian, Palestinian, and Israeli content.  To qualify a product in the QIZ, a minimum of  35% of the 
product’s appraised value must be produced in the QIZ.  The 35% may be arrived at using one of  three 
methods.  The first  is 11.7% from a Jordan QIZ, 8% from Israel (7% for high tech).  The remaining content 
may come from Jordan, Israel, West Bank/Gaza, and the USA.  The second method requires that Jordanian 
and Israeli manufacturers maintain at least 20% of the total production cost.  The third involves a 
combination of the first two methods.  Textiles and apparel have been the primary products of QIZ to 
circumvent the high US custom duty on these items.   Jordan feared that the 2005 expiration of the WTO 
multi-fiber agreement, which would allow China unimpeded access to the US market, would render the 
QIZs unprofitable.  The Bush administration, however,  reimposed textile quotas in some categories 
imported from China allowing a limited increase in imports to the US.  As a result, Jordan experienced a 
rise in the number of QIZ companies registering in 2005.  The QIZs ownership is overwhelmingly non 
Jordanian. 
The FTA is a phased arrangement, only eliminating duties on a number of products after 10 years.  
Products exported from QIZs have immediate duty and quota free access.  The rules of product origin are 
different between the QIZ and FTA with a larger Jordanian percent value added under FTA. 
18 Jordan officially launched ASEZA in May 2001.  As of 2004, the zone has attracted $1 billion in private 
investment and registered 250 companies.  The zone is the largest free zone at an area of 375 square 
kilometers.  It offers investors a business income tax set at 5%, no tariffs on imported goods, streamlined 
labor and immigration procedures, and no restrictions on foreign equity investment.  To date, the two 
largest projects appear to be tourism related, Tala Bay, a residential and resort complex, at $350 million 
and Ayla Oasis, a marine town, at about $700 million.  Over the next 20 years, approximately 50% of 
investments in Aqaba are anticipated to be tourism related, 30% in industry, and the remaining in services.  
The Jordan Times reported August 24, 2005 that a maintenance center serving Russian made planes 
operating on Middle East routes will start operating in 2007 at the King Hussein International Airport in 
Aqaba.  The project will benefit from incentives offered by ASEZA. 
Defense News reported May 29, 2006 that a Russian company OPK Oboronprom established a joint 
venture with a Jordanian Holding company, Orangeville Consultants for the production and maintenance of 
Kamov’s Ka-22 helicopter at an unspecified facility in Jordan. 
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Jordan into the global economy by spurring trade and investment.  Since 2000 there has 
been a rapid growth in merchandise exports especially in textile and pharmaceutical 
products.  A significant portion of export growth is due to duty and quota free access to 
US markets from the QIZs.  Table 3 details the increase in QIZ exports and number of 
QIZ companies.  In addition, job creation was regarded as an essential component of 
QIZs in Jordan.  The number of QIZ jobs created from 2001 to 2004 rose by 46% for 
local workers.  The jobs available for expatriate workers, however,  rose even more 
dramatically during the same time period by 360%.20   Table 4 details the QIZ labor force.  




In the early 1990s, Jordan’s military industry expertise lay with the Royal 
Maintenance Corps (RMC), which was charged with maintenance, overhaul, and limited 
upgrades of equipment.   The largest facility was the King Hussein Main Workshops 
(KHMW) in Zarqa.  The RMC rebuilt armored vehicles, performed some redesign on the 
British built Alvis Scorpion tracked reconnaissance vehicle and undertook the 
modernization of armored fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers.21  The RMC 
                                                                                                                                            
19 There is no documented case of defense  production in developing nations without government 
involvement.  The case of Mexico reinforces this argument where a much higher level of defense 
production would be expected than currently exists.  However, the consensus is that there is no political 
will to establish an defense industry even though there is a high level of civilian industrial capability. 
20 Many explanations have been provided for the increase in foreign workers.  They include the perception 
that foreign workers are more efficient, willing to work longer hours, and have higher skills than local 
workers.  However, Kardoosh and Khouri (2004) point out that the companies that are Jordanian owned 
have a small proportion of foreign workers and  in some cases none at all.   
21 The M60A1 main battle tank was upgraded to A3 standard.  In addition,  the Khalid (Chieftain) and 
Tariq (Centurion) MBTs were modified and routine and heavy maintenance performed to them at KHMW.    
Jane’s, 18 March, 1997 
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outfitted some Scorpions with TOW anti-tank missiles, and others with a mortar carrier.22 
This work was part of a plan to create an indigenous military industrial capability known 
as the Jordan National Industry.   
In August of 1999, the Jordanians established KADDB as an independent 
government entity within the Jordan Armed Forces (JAF) with a Board of Directors 
reporting to the Private Office of the King of Jordan through the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff.  KADDB’s operations are funded from the defense budget and earned 
income.    KADDB mission is to supply the JAF with a range of scientific and technical 
services in engineering and applied research including policy and technical advice and 
support, operational assessments and studies, formulation of user requirement statements, 
concept definition, project support, equipment trials and evaluation, and general 
support.23   In addition, KADDB is to provide training for Jordanian engineers in research, 
design, and development to facilitate further employment opportunities. 
KADDB operates with two strategic business groups.  The Engineering Group is 
responsible for the design, development, prototyping, evaluation, and industrialization of 
equipment primarily for the Jordanian armed and civil defense forces and secondarily for 
markets in the Middle East and North Africa.  KADDB’s Commercial Operations Group 
has two departments, Marketing and Business Development.  The commercial group is 
responsible for the marketing of KADDB projects, technologies, and services.  KADDB 
                                                
22 Jane’s, 19 June 1997. 
23 KADDB publication. 
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had expected to generate, within five years of its conception in 1999, a revenue stream 
enabling a self sufficient  Bureau to operate without government subsidies.24 
KADDB’s strategic direction, from its inception to 2005, was to focus on wheeled 
and tracked armored fighting vehicles (AFV) design, development, integration, 
prototyping, testing, and evaluation to be achieved through joint venture operations.  
KADDB medium term plans are to expand land system capabilities to include 
communication systems, battlefield management systems, and air defense systems.  
KADDB is to develop the capability to upgrade aircraft and integrate aircraft systems. 
Appendix A provides an overview of KADDB products.25  Table 7 details the companies 
KADDB formed, the strategic partners involved, and the employment generated. 
KADDB does not have access to offset agreements to help develop its capability 
since Jordan currently does not have offset agreements with any of its suppliers and, quite 
probably, does not have the purchasing power to be able to aggressively pursue offsets.  
However, since the benefits of offsets, both those that are direct and indirect, are 
questionable, it may be in Jordan’s best interest to refrain from pursuing this option; this 
is especially true because arms purchasers may actually pay a higher price when seeking 
offsets.  
                                                
24 According to KADDB sources, KADDB still receives funding from the Jordanian government of about  
$12 million a year. However, sales and revenue figures are not disclosed so it is not clear what percentage 
of KADDB operating funds are from the government, 
25 Defense News 03/30/06 reports that the Pince Feisal Information Technology Center in which KADDB 
is a 40% shareholder as an agreement with a university in the U.K. and Cranfietd University Defence 
Academy to educate Jordanians how to teach technology.  In. the first phase of the project,  Jordanian staff 
are to attend a course in defense technology in the U.K.  The second phase will allow the Jordanians to 
teach one third of the class in Jordan and, by the third phase, the Jordanians will take over teaching the 
class.  The material will eventually be translated to Arabic and offered in the region. 
Defense News 03/29/06 reports talks between Northrop Grumman and KADDB  to promote and support 
robotics in the region by having KADDB either assemble parts from kits or maintain the equipment. 
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The US has increased its military aid to Jordan since the mid 1990s, helping 
maintain Jordan’s level of  military expenditures. Jordan currently has one of the highest 
military expenditures to GDP ratios for its income class.  The Jordanian Armed Forces 
currently rely on the United States Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for a substantial 
percentage of their military expenditures. Table 8 details the Annual US military 
assistance to Jordan.  The US level of aid has fluctuated widely over the past 10 years in 
response to political conditions and available aid funding.  Jordan can not access FMF for 
domestic acquisition, and as such, KADDB does not have the flexibility to use these 
funds to help develop Jordan’s indigenous defense industry.26  However, because of the 
fungibility of these funds, Jordan is able to maintain the same level of military 
expenditures with less domestic funds and at the same time support its defense industry. 
 
V. KADDB and QIZ 
KADDB and the QIZ are the two major economic efforts undertaken by the 
Jordanian government to stimulate the domestic economy.  Although, the QIZ program 
was established three years before KADDB, comparing their performance to this point 
would be beneficial.  
In absolute numbers, even after accounting for expatriate employment, the QIZs 
have created more employment opportunities for Jordanians than KADDB27.  Most of the 
QIZ created jobs, however,  require minimal technical skills. Data available from the 
Ministry of Industry and Trade for 2002 provide a rough classification of jobs available 
                                                
26 Jordan conducts courses and training for the New Iraqi Army Training Project with US funding.  Data 
regarding the extent of KADDB’s participation and benefit from this is unavailable. 
27 The number of jobs generated by the QIZs  in 2003, five years from their establishment, are about 15214.  
The jobs generated by KADDB in 2005, five years after establishment, are about 1300. 
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in 31 QIZs.  While it is difficult to determine the level of skills required using the job 
description provided, by the process of eliminating obviously low skilled positions, it is 
estimated that, at a maximum 6% of domestic jobs generated by QIZs, about 1200, 
require some technical expertise.28  Although, the available information for the jobs 
KADDB created is not complete, it would not exceed 1250 positions and presumably a 
high percentage of them require some technical skills and a fair percentage would require 
some form of higher education.29   
The level of technology used in the QIZs does not extend beyond garment 
assembly (sewing, ironing and washing). As such, the technology transfer from the QIZs 
into Jordan is minimal.  Applying Krause’s production ladder, the QIZs probably operate 
at an equivalent of level one with the ability to perform simple maintenance work.  
KADDB, using Krause’s “ladder of production” has reached level five by having attained 
the capability of performing final assembly of less sophisticated weapons with some local 
component production and to a small extent may have reached level six of co-production 
or complete licensed production of less sophisticated weapons.  KADDB has started 
operating at level seven of limited R&D improvements to local license produced arms for 
some systems.  KADDB is clearly transferring more technology into Jordan than the 
QIZs.  Comparing the technology transferred by KADDB and the civilian sector into the 
country, it appears to be at about the same level for equipment manufacturing and 
                                                
28 Based on information provided by the Ministry of Trade and Industry.  The author considers jobs that are 
described as supervisory, maintenance, IT, personnel, accounting, nursing, public relations, and translating 
as requiring  technical  skills.  Packing, cutting, sewing, security, driving, and washing are not technical. 
29 Based on information provided by KADDB, the number of direct KADDB employees is 300 with  
approximately 30 in management, 200 skilled technically and the remainder semiskilled and non-skilled. 
The joint venture companies employ around 950 people.  KADDB was unable to provide a breakdown by 
skills for the joint venture companies. 
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assembly.30  However, the IT transfer into the country appears to be higher than that 
available in the civilian sector.31  
Little evidence exists to confirm  the QIZ or the KADDB success  in creating 
strong backward and forward linkages into the economy because of Jordan’s narrow 
industrial base.  QIZs essentially transform imported raw material into a finished product.  
Little of what goes into creating a final product originates domestically and the value 
added comes from the transformation (i.e. fabric into clothing).  Table 5 lists the number 
of subcontractor companies created in the QIZ zones to support QIZ activites.  All these 
companies are connected in some way to the garment industry32.  There is no 
employment or sales data available for these companies.   As it takes very little capital 
investment to establish a garment facility, these industries are easy to relocate to other 
countries.  The concern is that the  QIZs located in Jordan could migrate to Turkey, 
Morocco, or Egypt, nations with a larger domestic industrial base,  when these nations  
conclude similar arrangements with the US.33  KADDB seems to make a policy of 
partnering with a domestic civilian entity for its projects.  As such, these civilian entities 
may be able to transfer their knowledge and experience into the civilian economy.  What 
is not clear at this time is the extent of these industries reliance on defense work and 
whether they have been able to branch out into the non-defense sector. 
                                                
30 Civilian joint ventures were concluded to maintain and produce the Russian Ka-266 helicopter and to 
manufacture and assemble of Land Rover vehicles activities similar to those of KADDB.  Jane’s 
Information Group,  August 1, 2004. 
31 This is based on the premise that the staff of the Prince Faisal Information Technology Center have had 
to receive training outside Jordan because the technology and the skilled staff are not available in the 
country. 
32 No details exist as to what business these companies are engaged in.  However, all have a variant of the 
word textile or garment in their name.  There is no employment or sales data available for these companies.  
They are small privately held business not involved in export and presumably provide support services such 
as packing and laundering. 
33 The majority of QIZs are owned by non-Jordanian.  Table 6 details the ownership of the QIZs. 
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QIZ generated exports increased from $2.44 million in 1999 to $919.94 million in 
2004.  These constituted 23% of all exports from Jordan in 2004.  All QIZ exports are 
directed to the US and it is highly unlikely that Jordan exports to the US would have 
increased at this rate without the QIZ arrangements.  What is not clear at this time is 
Jordan’s success at cultivating the EU and regional markets for QIZ type products.  At 
this point, it is impossible to gauge KADDB’s success in exporting since KADDB does 
not disclose its sales figures.  However, KADDB reports some success exporting to 
Algeria, Iraq, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Yemen, and UAE.34  KADDB also reports 
sales to the JAF.  Again, sales figures were not made available.  
Neither the QIZs nor KADDB have been successful in attracting regional capital.  
The QIZ companies have generated about $182 million in Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI).  Approximately 88% of the capital is classified as non-Arab and 5.7% as Jordanian 
with the balance of 6.3% being regional capital.35  None of the KADDB joint venture 
companies list a regional partner (Table 7) and KADDB does not report figures regarding 
the amount of FDI resulting from non-regional partners.36   
 
VI. Conclusion 
Whether KADDB can have a positive influence on the Jordanian economy is still 
an open question.  The success of the development of an indigenous military industry is 
dependent on the existing level of civilian industrialization.  Working against the success 
                                                
34 The items sold are the Desert Iris, Body armor and helmets, armored vehicles, ammunition, and small 
arms.  Source:KADDB, 2006. 
35 Kardoosh and Khouri (2004) 
36 Seabid Aviation Jordan in its online publicity material, 
http://www.seabirdaviationjordan.com/about_us.shtm reports the sale of equity to the Dabin Group, a 
regional company.  However, the date, size, and conditions of the transaction are not reported. 
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of military industries in Jordan is the very same thing that the military industries have 
envisioned creating, a civilian industry.  The developing nations that have had some 
measure of success in defense production, such as Brazil, South Africa, Taiwan, and 
South Korea,  had a foundation of a diversified civilian industrial sector.  The evidence in 
support of the economic gains resulting from the establishment of military industries is 
quite mixed for developing countries since defense industry is less productive than 
civilian industry;  research indicates that the reallocations from defense spending to other 
forms of government spending increase employment.   In addition, investment in defense 
production and poor choices of military technology lead to underinvestment in civilian 
industries, thus, defeating the purpose of using defense industrialization to jumpstart 
civilian industries. 
The arms market is a buyer’s market, especially for low technology products.  
Demand is for high technology,  particularly after the recent engagements in the Middle 
East proved the superiority of technically advanced weapons systems.  As such, KADDB 
will face intense competition in breaking into the international market and needs an 
attractive opening to take advantage of economies of scale or dual use technology in its 
production. 
Skilled labor is an essential input into any business venture.  As such, KADDB 
should offer competitive wages to retain skilled labor,  and should actively recruit and 
train personnel from outside the armed forces to avoid introspection and to provide a 
diverse perspective and a cadre of technically skilled personnel.  
KADDB is realistic in its expectations of the industries it is seeking to establish.  
No attempt has been made to attempt to import or deal with technology beyond its reach 
 22 
and has accepted a certain level of technological dependence.   Nonetheless, it needs to 
maintain a high quality of research and development to guarantee its survival. 
KADDB has made serious efforts to recruit domestic civilian industrial partners 
and, perhaps working to its advantage, has no offset agreements with any outside 
suppliers.  In addition, KADDB has established an engineering group, manufacturing 
group, programs group, and several other departments including marketing, business 
development, supply, operations, and strategic studies that are hopefully engaged in long 
range regional and security planning.    
KADDB could potentially benefit from Jordan’s position as a “gateway to the 
Iraqi market” and establish a niche market.  What remains to be seen is whether KADDB 
can develop the regional markets that it sees for its products and whether it can expand 
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Temsah: Temsah is a conversion of a Main Battle Tank (MBT) to provide a 
mission capable, multi-configured heavily protected Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV).  
The Temsah, developed in collaboration with Mechanology Design Bureau of South 
Africa, General Dynamics, and CLS Jordan, is based on a modified Tariq MBT chassis, 
which is a British supplied and General Dymanics upgraded Centurion.   
Phoenix M60 battle tank upgrade: KADDB, in conjunction with General 
Dynamics, RUAG, and Raytheon,  developed the Phoenix battle tanks upgrade. This 
upgrade involves a mobility, lethality, and shoot on the move to increase the M60s 
operational capability. 
Falcon Turret: KADDB, in partnership with the Mechanology Design Bureau 
(MDB) and IST Dynamics of South Africa developed the Falcon Turret as part of 
intellectual development and technology transfer between the South African defense 
industrial private sector and Jordan.  The intended platform for the turret is the Al- 
Hussein MBT (British Army Challenger 1). 
Desert Ranger: The Desert Ranger is an all terrain motorcycle designed by Rokon 
and modified by  KADDB to meet Jordanian military requirements. 
Monjed P2: The Monjed is a  converted recovery vehicle based on the chassis of 
the decommissioned M60A1 battle tank.  The Monjed is a collaboration between 
KADDB and the Jordan Armed Forces. 
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Armored Shield: Armored shield provides protection for the gunner on the M113 
Armored Personnel Carrier (APC).  The shield was designed by KADDB in association 
with the Jordan Armed Forces. 
M113A2 MK1J APC: This is essentially a mobility upgrade for a M113A1 APC 
with United Defense Industries.  It includes a new turbocharged engine, associated 
transmission, drive train, differential and suspension upgrade kits.  
Road Wheels and Tracks: KADDB in partnership with the RMC will refurbish 
and manufacture Armored Fighting Vehicle (AFV) tracks, pads,  and road wheels. 
 Al-Jawad: Al-Jawad is an armored troop carrier designed and engineered by 
KADDB in conjunction with Jankel.  The carrier comprises an armored body and 
standard Ford chassis.   
 Stirling Tactical intervention Vehicle: The Stirling is a collaborative project 
between KADDB and Jankel.   The vehicle is a counter terrorist vehicle for use by 
hostage rescue teams. 
 Al Thalab: Al-Thalab is a long range patrol vehicle developed by KADDB in 
conjunction with Jankel. 
Armored Toyota 78 and 105 Land Cruiser: in partnership with Jankel. 
 Desert Iris 4x4: The Iris is a multipurpose light weight utility vehicle developed in 
conjunction with SHP Motorsports.37 
Unmanned Arial Vehicles (UAV): KADDB in partnership with Jordan Advanced 
Remote Systems (JARS), and Jordan Aerospace Industries has developed three modes of 
UAVs.   The Jordan Silent Eye portable UAV designed for scouting missions.  The 
                                                
37 Lockheed Martin and KADDB mount a two laser designated Hellfire II guided missile on the Desert Iris. 
(Defense News 03/30/2006) 
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Falcon designed for surveillance missions, and the Arrow for air defense training and 
weapons systems.  In addition, JARS has equipped the Canadian licensed, locally 
produced Sama CH 2000 single prop, two seater aircraft with a camera and infrared 
surveillance ball. 
Combat body armor and helmet: The body armor is manufactured in association 
with NP Aerospace Ltd. UK. 
Surveillance aircraft: KADDB and Seabird Aviation of Australia established a 
joint venture in 2003 to assemble the Seeker SB7L-360 low level observation and 
surveillance aircraft at an air base in Jordan to supply aircraft to Iraq for patrol protection 
of oil fields and pipelines. 
Refurbished vehicles: ITT industries Systems Division (ITT-SD) of the US and 
KADDB entered into a contractual agreement to facilitate the delivery of repaired and 
refurbished US military vehicles to the Iraqi Armed Forces.  A significant volume of the 
work will be subcontracted to KADDB joint venture and partner companies.38 
Marine products: KABBD is a joint venture with Hurricane Engineering will 
provide complete solutions for marine operators, from design, development, and 
manufacture to after sales support. 
A number of cooperative programs have been instituted on the back of recent projects: 
electrical equipment and manufacturing repair facility operated by CLS Jordan, electrical 
harness production with Raytech of Austria; the establishment of a forward logistics base 
                                                
38 Defense News 03/30/2006 reposts that ITT wants to establish a regional facility for vehicle maintenance 
and upgrade at an existing KADDB facility in Zarka, Jordan. Currently,  KADDB’s facility in Zarka is 
being used to upgrade M800 and M900 series trucks and could be forced to close at the end of the project 
for lack of work. 
In addition, Defense News 03/30/2006 reports that Thales is in talks with KADDB to capture some of the 
Iraqi vehicle fleet’s upgrades.  KADDB would act as a prime contractor and systems integrator while 
Thales would supply the electronic equipment. 
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at Aqaba by Raytheon; and the introduction of composite materials technology by XS 
Design of Germany and Swesco of Sweden 
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Figure 1: Time Progression of Defense Production











1. Capability of performing simple 
maintenance
2. Overhaul, refurbishment and rudimentary 
modification capabilities
3. Assembly of imported components, 
simple licensed production
4. Local production of components or raw 
materials
5. Final assembly of less sophisticated 
weapons; some local component 
production.
6. Co-production or complete licensed 
production of less sophisticated weapons
7. Limited R&D improvements to local 
license -produced arms
8. Limited independent production of less 
sophisticated weapons; limited production 
of more advanced weapons
9. Independent R&D and production of less 
sophisticated weapons
10. Independent R&D and production of 
advanced arms with foreign components
11. Completely independent R&D production 
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Table 1: Jordan Military Expenditure
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Milex(m dinars) 301 326 361 586 417 445 491 512 531 537 551 629 623  
Milex (constant 2003 US $m) 564 592 634 1004 671 694 744 771 795 789 796 887 849
Government Expenditures (m dinar) 1081.2 1235.1 1312.8 1471.5 1666.9 1681.9 1876.8 1804.1 1868.6 2027.7 na na na
GDP (m dinar) 3610 3884 4358 4714 4912 5137 5609 5767 5989 6338 6698 7056.2 na
Defense/GDP 8.3 8.4 8.3 12.4 8.5 8.7 8.8 8.9 8.9 8.5 8.2 8.9 na
Defense/Gov 27.8 26.4 27.5 39.8 25.0 26.5 26.2 28.4 28.4 26.5 na  
Source: Milex data SIPRI
GDP IMF IFS, 2005.
Government Expenditures  IMF IFS, 2006.
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Table 2: The steps in defense production for a developing nation 
 
1 Capability of performing simple maintenance 
2 Overhaul, refurbishment and rudimentary modification capabilities 
3 Assembly of imported components, simple licensed production 
4 Local production of components or raw materials 
5 Final assembly of less sophisticated weapons; some local component 
production. 
6 Co-production or complete licensed production of less sophisticated weapons 
7 Limited R&D improvements to local license-produced arms 
8 Limited independent production of less sophisticated weapons; limited 
production of more advanced weapons 
9 Independent R&D and production of less sophisticated weapons 
10 Independent R&D and production of advanced arms with foreign components 







Table 3: Jordan Exports
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Number of QIZ companies 2 12 38 43 49 58 55
QIZ exports m USD na na na na na na na 2.44 25.19 150.12 381.2 586.61 919.94 1011
Total exports (m dinar) 829.31 864.66 995.2 1241.1 1288.2 1301.4 1277.9 1298.8 1346.6 1626.4 1963.9 2184.87 2800.3 3088.73*
Total exports (m USD) 1200.01 1227.82 1420.15 1749.95 1816.36 1834.97 1801.84 1831.31 1898.71 2293.22 2769.10 3080.67 3948.42 4355.11*
QIZ/exports(%) na na na na na na na 0.13 1.33 6.55 13.77 19.04 23.30 23.21
Source: QIZ exports Jordan Ministry of Industry and Trade, Industrial Development Directorate.
Total exports, IMF IFS, 2005.




Table 4:  QIZ Direct Employment
Year 2001 2002 2003       2004 2005
Local 13300 13900 15214 19416 16411
Expatriate 5700 9600 11339 26418 29902
Total 19000 23500 26553 45834 46313
% Local/Total 70.00 59.15 57.30 42.36 35.43
 
Source: Jordan Ministry of Industry and Trade, Industrial Development Directorate.
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Table 5: Established QIZs
Ownership QIZ Status QIZ Companies Sub Contractors
Al Hassan Industrial Estate Public active 15 21
Al Hussein Bin Abdullah II Industrial City(Al-Karak) Public active 3 1
Aqaba QIZ public not active 0 0
Ad-Dulayl Industrial Park private active 13 6
Al-Tajamout Industrial City private active 19 12
Cyber City Park private active 2 3
Al-Qastal Industrial Park private active 2 0
Al-Zay Ready Wear (Al-Rusaifa) private active 1 0
Al-Mashta Qualified Industrial Park private not active n/a n/a
Gateway Park private not active n/a n/a
Hillwood Hashemite University private not active n/a n/a
Al-Hallabat Industrial Park private active n/a n/a
Al-Mawared private active n/a n/a
Data as of 8/2006
Source: Ministry of Industry and Trade  
 37 
Table 6: QIZ Companies
Ownership Location 
Sari International UK Al-Hassan Industrial Estate
Falcon 50% UK, 50% Chinese Al-Hassan Industrial Estate
Century Standard Textile Jordan Al-Hassan Industrial Estate
Century Miracle 65% UK, 35% Jordan Al-Hassan Industrial Estate
Century Trading 50% Jordan, 50% Netherlands Al-Hassan Industrial Estate
Oasis Textile International Thai Al-Hassan Industrial Estate
Business Faith 60% UK, 40% Hongkong Al-Hassan Industrial Estate
American Jordanian Company for Apparel USA Al-Hassan Industrial Estate
Rolex UAE Al-Hassan Industrial Estate
Al-Manar Jordan Al-Hassan Industrial Estate
International Business 80% UK, 20% China Al-Hassan Industrial Estate
Classic Fashion Apparel Industry India Al-Hassan Industrial Estate
United Bright UK Al-Hassan Industrial Estate
Elmasira 98% Israel, 2% Jordan Al-Hassan Industrial Estate
Hussen Israel Al-Hassan Industrial Estate
Century Wear 50% Jordan, 50% Swiss Al-Hassan Industrial Estate
Camel Textile 100% UK Al Hussein Bin Abdullah II Industrial City(Al-Karak)
Honorway Apparel 67% Bangladesh, 33% Hongkong Al Hussein Bin Abdullah II Industrial City(Al-Karak)
Expo Jordan Al Hussein Bin Abdullah II Industrial City(Al-Karak)
HI-Tech Textile Pakistan Ad-Dulayl Industrial Park
United Creations LLC Israel Ad-Dulayl Industrial Park
Mediterranean UAE Ad-Dulayl Industrial Park
Petra Pakistan Ad-Dulayl Industrial Park
Rainbow textiles Pakistan Ad-Dulayl Industrial Park
Neddle Craft Pakistan Ad-Dulayl Industrial Park
Fine Apparel Ltd. 50% Pakistan, 50% USA Ad-Dulayl Industrial Park
Mustafa and Kamal Oman Ad-Dulayl Industrial Park
Al-Qadir India Ad-Dulayl Industrial Park
Bee Line 80% Singapore, 20% India Ad-Dulayl Industrial Park
Sun Jordan Turkey Ad-Dulayl Industrial Park
Al-Mateen 90% Israel, 10% Jordan Ad-Dulayl Industrial Park
Ayam Maliban SriLanka Ad-Dulayl Industrial Park
New World Textile USA Al-Tajamout Industrial City
Al-Aham UK Al-Tajamout Industrial City
Maintrend UK Al-Tajamout Industrial City
CCKM USA Al-Tajamout Industrial City
United Garments 50% Jordan, 50% Pakistan Al-Tajamout Industrial City
Jerash Fashions UK Al-Tajamout Industrial City
Silver Planet Pakistan Al-Tajamout Industrial City
Fomosa China Al-Tajamout Industrial City
Ivory India Al-Tajamout Industrial City
Dragon Jordan 50% UK, 50% China Al-Tajamout Industrial City
Prestige India Al-Tajamout Industrial City
Aseel India Al-Tajamout Industrial City
Golden Wear India Al-Tajamout Industrial City
Pacific India Al-Tajamout Industrial City
Taiyar China Al-Tajamout Industrial City
Atatex Turkey Al-Tajamout Industrial City
Jordan Silk 60% Jordan, 40% China Al-Tajamout Industrial City
W&D Taiwan Al-Tajamout Industrial City
El-Zay Ready Wear Manufacturing Co Jordan Al-Zay Ready Wear (Al-Rusaifa)
United Textile Group Jordan Al-Qastal Industrial Park
Prime Five Manufacturing Jordan Al-Qastal Industrial Park
Rich Pine UK Cyber City Park
Caliber India Cyber City Park
Data as of 08/2006
Source: Ministry of Trade and Development  
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Table 7: KADDB Joint Venture Companies
Ownership Share(%) Specialization
Jordan Light Vehicle Manufacturing (JVLM) KADDB                74.50% Manufacturing and customizing of armored vehicles
Jankel                   25.50%
Jordan Special Vehicle Manufacturing (JSVM) KADDB Desert Iris
CLS Jordan KADDB                 48.50% Automotive and electrical equipment
CLS Middle East    51.50%
Raytech Jordan KADDB                33.33% Electrical harnesses, systems design
CLS Middle East   33.34%
Raytech               33.33%
Seabird Aviation Jordan KADDB                49.53% Light aircraft
Seabird Aviation    50.47%
NP Aerospace Jordan KADDB                    49.00% helmets and body armor
NP Aerospace          51.00%
Josecure International KADDB                  100.00% Pesonal and infrastructure security
National Resources Development Company KADDB                  100.00% Service and solutions in security field
Prince Faisal Information Technology Center KADDB                    20.00% Education in IT, embedded systems, and software 
Yarmouk University   40.00% technology
Park Controls           40.00%
Mechanology Jordan KADDB                   49.00% Marketing and sales of military and commercial 
Mechanology           10.00% products
The Virlean Initiative  41.00%
Sofex Jordan KADDB                  100.00% Exhibit space
Ultimate Building Machines Investment and Development KADDB 100.00% Steel fabrication and hanger construction
United Jordanian for Technical Consultancy KADDB                  100.00% Consulting services (not active)
United Jordanian Telecom Networks KADDB                  100.00% Technical services (not active)
Applied Defense Systems KADDB                   34.00% Defense electronics (not active)
Yazan Muft              33.00%
Amin Bader             33.00%
Jordan Armaments and Weapons Systems KADDB                 100.00% multi caliber pistol
Source: KADDB
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Table 8: Annual U.S. Military Aid to Jordan
Military Assistance Military Assistance Jordan mil ex % U.S. funded
(current year M$) (2003 M$) (2003 M$)
Fiscal Year FMF IMET FMF IMET
1991 20 1.3 27.01 1.76 544 5.3
1992 20 0.6 26.22 0.79 564 4.8
1993 9 0.5 11.46 0.64 592 2.0
1994 9 0.8 11.17 0.99 634 1.9
1995 7.3 1 8.81 1.21 1004 1.0
1996 200 1.2 234.57 1.41 671 35.2
1997 30 1.7 34.38 1.95 694 5.2
1998 75 1.6 84.64 1.81 744 11.6
1999 70 1.6 77.30 1.77 771 16.7
1999 (Wye) 50 0 55.22 0.00
2000 75 1.6 80.12 1.71 795 29.2
2000 (Wye) 150 0 160.24 0.00
2001 75 1.7 77.92 1.77 789 10.1
2002 75 2 76.70 2.05 796 13.0
2002 (suppl) 25 0 25.57 0.00
2003 198 2.4 198.00 2.40 887 68.4
2003 (suppl) 406 0 406.00 0.00
2004 206 2.9 200.63 2.82 849 24.0
2004 (suppl) 0 0 0.00 0.00
2005 206 3 194.04 2.83
2005 (suppl) 100 0 94.20 0.00
2006 210 3 na na
2007 206 3.1 na na
Source: Congressional Research Service Issue Brief for Congress
Jordan: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues, updated March 14,2006
SIPRI for Jordan mil ex
IMF IFS for deflator  
 
